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COMMENTARY
Some Reflections on State Constitutions*
By JOSEPH R. GRODIN**
In downtown Monterey, California, within walking distance of Fish-
ermen's Wharf, stands a spacious building of yellow sandstone called
Colton Hall. The first floor housed California's first public school. On
the second floor there is a room, about sixty feet long and twenty-five feet
wide, with a railing across the middle and four long tables. It is not a
particularly imposing setting, but here, in September 1849, California
history was made.
On the first day of that month delegates from various parts of what
was soon to become the thirty-ninth state of the Union came together in
that room in response to a call for a constitutional convention.' It was a
tumultuous period in California. People were coming to the state by the
thousands in search of fortune, or fame, or freedom, or whatever it is that
inspires adventuresome people to pick up their roots and try their luck in
a new and strange land. There was no central law, no centralized gov-
ernment, nothing but an accumulation of small and isolated communi-
ties, stretching from burgeoning San Francisco in the north to thepueblo
of Los Angeles in the south, and from the coast to the foothills where, it
was said, there was still much gold to be found. Authority, to the extent
it existed at all, resided in a de facto military government,2 and in make-
* This Commentary is based on a speech to the American Judicature Society at the
American Bar Association Convention in San Francisco, August 8, 1987, and is the basis for a
chapter in the author's forthcoming book on state courts, to be published by University of
California Press.
** Associate Justice, California Supreme Court, 1982-1987; Professor of Law, University
of California, Hastings College of the Law.
1. For a general description of the California Constitutional Convention of 1849, see 6
H. BANCROFT, HISTORY OF CALIFORNIA 284-304 (1888), R. HUNT, THE GENESIS OF CALI-
FORNIA'S FIRST CONSTITUTION (1846-1849) 34-51 (1973), N. HARLOW, CALIFORNIA CON-
QUERED 338-53 (1982), and J. ROYCE, CALIFORNIA: THE CONQUEST IN 1846 TO THE
SECOND VIGILANCE COMMITTEE IN SAN FRANCISCO 205-13 (1948).
2. See generally N. HARLOW, supra note 1, at 277-300 (describing the administration
under military governor Colonel Richard B. Mason, 1847-1849).
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shift local arrangements, largely of the vigilante variety.' It was appar-
ent to everyone who thought about such things that there needed to be
some orderly governance, but the Congress of the United States, anxious
about having to confront the slavery issue in a new territory, was sitting
on its collective hands.4
It was Brigadier General Bennet Riley, the de facto military gover-
nor, who was responsible for the remarkable gathering in Monterey. He
had issued the call for a constitutional convention, decreeing that dele-
gates should be chosen by grassroots meetings in the mining camps and
communities throughout the land.' To observers it must have seemed an
unlikely prospect, but almost at the last minute, it actually happened.
And there they were, arriving by boat, carriage, and horseback, ready to
participate in a process that was to provide the legal structure for Cali-
fornia's admission in the Union.
They must have been a strange looking group; they were certainly
diverse. Some had lived in California all their lives- these were the
"Californios", the Spaniards with names like Vallejo,6 De la Guerra,7
Carrillo,' and Covarrubias. Most of them, however, were newcomers-
miners and lawyers, physicians and farmers, businessmen and trackers.
They had come to California from the East Coast, or some of them, like
John Sutterl ° and a man named William Shannon," from places as far
away as Switzerland or Ireland. The oldest among them was fifty-three,
the youngest twenty-five, the average age thirty-six. 12
An historian of the event was to observe: "It may be doubted if the
members of any previous convention in the United States, with similar
purpose, ever came together so totally unacquainted with each other and
3. See generally J. ROYCE, supra note 1, at 214-96, 328-66 (describing the development
of popular justice in the mining camps to the formation of "vigilance committees" in San
Francisco).
4. The United States Congress, deadlocked over the future of slavery in new territories,
provided no legal form of government for California from the end of the Mexican War in 1848
until its admission into the Union on September 9, 1850. See J. ROYCE, supra note 1, at 202.
5. See N. HARLOW, supra note 1, at 338-39; R. HUNT, supra note 1, at 34-35.
6. General Mariano Guadalupe Vallejo, delegate from Sonoma.
7. Pablo de la Guerra, delegate from Santa Barbara.
8. Jos6 Antonio Carrillo, delegate from Los Angeles.
9. Jos6 M. Covarrubias, delegate from San Luis Obispo.
10. Captain John A. Sutter, delegate from Sacramento. It was the discovery of gold in
Sutter's sawmill that touched off the Gold Rush of 1849 and gave impetus to California's quest
for statehood.
11. William E. Shannon, delegate from Sacramento.
12. 6 H. BANCROFT, supra note 1, at 288. For a general description of the delegates, see
W. HANSEN, THE SEARCH FOR AUTHORITY IN CALIFORNIA 97-105 (1960).
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so entirely wanting in general concert of plans or policies of action."
13
No doubt that is true. But one cannot read the record of their proceed-
ings, which were duly recorded,14 without being impressed with their
dedication and intelligence. Some delegates had considerable experience
with political matters in other states; 5 one delegate, William M. Gwin,
had served in Congress and in another state constitutional convention.16
Most did not have that kind of experience. But all of them took their
jobs seriously, and they put together a document which served the new
state quite well until 1879, when a second constitutional convention was
held and substantial changes were made.
1 7
One part of the 1849 constitution that was not changed in any sig-
nificant respect was article I, called the Declaration of Rights.1 Article I
was in fact the first item of business considered at the Monterey Conven-
tion, immediately after the seating of delegates. It was the product of a
drafting committee, and it consists of sixteen sections. Mr. Gwin, a
spokesman for the committee, reported that half the sections came from
the constitution of New York, and half from the constitution of Iowa.9
Copies of the committee draft were distributed to the delegates. One dele-
gate requested an adjournment for two reasons: first, so that copies of
additional state constitutions could be located and brought to the con-
vention room, and second, so that the draft could be translated into
Spanish for the benefit of the native Californians.2' Mr. Gwin explained
that translations had already been made; nevertheless, the convention
was adjourned until the following day.
After several days of discussion in committee, the delegates as a
whole proceeded to consider, one by one, the sections of the Declaration
13. R. HUNT, supra note 1, at 37.
14. The debates of the convention were officially recorded by J. Ross Browne. See 3.
BROWNE, REPORT OF THE DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION OF CALIFORNIA, ON THE FORMA-
TION OF THE STATE CONSTITUTION, IN SEPTEMBER AND OCTOBER 1849 (1850).
15. Winfield S. Sherwood, delegate from Sacramento, had served in the New York Legis-
lature prior to emigrating to California. Charles T. Botts, delegate from Monterey, had been
active in politics in Virginia.
16. William M. Gwin, delegate from San Francisco, had previously served as a member of
the United States Congress from Mississippi and had attended the Iowa Constitutional Con-
vention of 1846. Subsequent to his participation in the California Convention of 1848, Gwin
served as one of California's first two United States Senators.
17. The second constitution was adopted in convention March 3, 1879, and ratified by the
people May 7, 1879.
18. CAL. CONST. art. I.
19. J. BROWNE, supra note 14, at 31.
20. A bit of historical irony, perhaps, in light of the recently adopted initiative in Califor-
nia declaring piously that English is the official language of the state. See CAL. CONST. art.
III, § 6.
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of Rights. As to some there was no debate; as to others there was consid-
erable discussion. Mr. Botts,2 ' an immigrant from Virginia, rose to ques-
tion some language in section 3, pertaining to freedom of religious
practices and worship. The language to which he objected was a proviso
which read: "the liberty of conscience hereby secured, shall not be so
construed as to excuse acts of licentiousness or justify practices inconsis-
tent with the peace or safety of the State."'22 What is the meaning of this
language, Mr. Botts inquired. Would it authorize the legislature to out-
law the Roman Catholic Church? Why not, suggested Mr. Botts, use
"the most eloquent and beautiful" language on freedom of worship from
the constitution of Virginia.23
Mr. Sherwood,24 from New York, rose in reply. The gentleman
from Virginia, he opined, was evidently not acquainted with the history
of the new religious sects in the State of New York, or he would see the
propriety of the restrictions contained in the proposed language. "There
have been sects known there to discard all decency," advised the proper
Mr. Sherwood, "and admit spiritual wives, where men and women have
herded together, without any regard for the established usages of soci-
ety. ' '25 The restrictive language was deemed necessary, he concluded, so
"that society should be protected from the demoralizing influence of fa-
natical sects, who thought proper to discard all pretensions to de-
cency. ' ' 26 Following which, the proposed language was adopted, over
Mr. Botts' objection.27
Among the delegates was Mr. Hastings, a lawyer of sorts who also
held himself out as a guide to overland routes.28 A thoughtful man, Mr.
21. See supra note 15.
22. J. BROWNE, supra note 14, at 38-39. Proposed article I, § 3, to which Mr. Botts was
referring, read in full:
The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without dis-
crimination or preference, shall forever be allowed in this State to all mankind; and
no person shall be rendered incompetent to be a witness on account of his opinions
on matters of religious beliefs; but the liberty of conscience hereby secured, shall not
be so construed as to excuse acts of licentiousness, or justify practices inconsistent
with the peace or safety of the State.
Id. at 30.
23. Id. at 38-39.
24. Winfield S. Sherwood, delegate from Sacramento.
25. J. BROWNE, supra note 14, at 39.
26. Id.
27. Id. Later in the proceedings the irrepressible Botts rose to inquire whether another
provision, under consideration at the time was also derived from the constitution of New
York. If it were, Botts declared, he wanted to vote for it, so that he could be, for a change, in
the majority. Id. at 41.
28. Lansford W. Hastings, delegate from Sacramento. Mr. Hastings' qualifications as a
guide were rather suspect-historians of the period say he was more of a promoter. See 4 H.
Hastings came forward with what must have seemed a rather startling
proposal. He suggested that the committee draft be amended to outlaw
capital punishment on the ground that it is as immoral for the state to
take a human life as it is for an individual to do so.29 After what ap-
peared to have been some polite, if condescending discussion, the amend-
ment was defeated.3" The report of the proceedings does not record the
vote.
And so it went. In the end, the committee draft of the Declaration
of Rights was adopted with minor changes. One significant change was
the addition of a provision prohibiting slavery.3 Some of the draft provi-
sions received a good deal of discussion; some, at least so far as it was
reported, received none at all. Nonetheless, for the reader interested in
the relationship between the California and federal Constitutions, the de-
bate vividly illustrates two important lessons.
The first lesson is that the language of the California Declaration of
Rights was deliberately drawn from the constitutions of other states, not
from the language of the federal Constitution. Despite the frequent use of
language similar and indeed, in some cases, identical to the federal Bill of
Rights, the delegates were not looking to the federal Constitution as their
model. The constitution of New York, which formed the basis for
roughly half of the language, was adopted before the federal Constitu-
tional Convention in Philadelphia.3- The constitution of Iowa, though
adopted after the federal Convention, was an equally independent
document.33
The second lesson is that, just as the framers of the California Con-
stitution were not looking to the federal Constitution as a model for
drafting, neither were they looking to it as a legal basis for protecting
rights and liberties from interference by the new state. It would be an-
other twenty years before the federal Constitution would be amended to
provide protection against state action,34 and another sixty years after
that before the United States Supreme Court would recognize the due
BANCROFT, supra note 1, at 396-99. The fact that his book on emigrant routes was relied upon
by the ill-fated Donner Party is scarcely a recommendation.
29. J. BROWNE, supra note 14, at 45-46. The proposed amendment provided: "As the
true design of all punishment is to reform and not to exterminate mankind, death shall never
be inflicted as a punishment for crime in this State." Id at 46.
30. Id. at 46.
31. Delegate Shannon successfully introduced the declaration: "Neither slavery nor invol-
untary servitude... shall ever be tolerated in this State." Id at 43-44.
32. The New York Constitution was adopted in 1777. The Federal Constitutional Con-
vention convened in Philadephia in May 1787; the document was ratified in 1788.
33. The Iowa Constitution was adopted in 1846.
34. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (adopted in 1868).
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process guaranty of the Fourteenth Amendment as incorporating most of
the protections of the Bill of Rights and making them applicable to the
states. If anything was clear to the delegates in 1849, it was that if
there was to be any constitutional protection for the rights and liberties
of Californians against action by the state, it was through the constitu-
tion they were drafting, in that modest schoolhouse in Monterey.
Both these lessons are well-known, of course, to any student of con-
stitutional history. But, if my own experience is any guide, they are typi-
cally known in an abstract, and thus less compelling, way. In 1970,
when I went to teach for a year at the University of Oregon Law School,
Hans Linde (now an Oregon Supreme Court Justice, but then a law pro-
fessor and the leading proponent of the independence of state constitu-
tions) did his best to persuade me of his point of view. Linde's thesis
was, basically, that state constitutions are prior to the federal Constitu-
tion both historically and logically. Historically, states have constitu-
tions with bills of rights which predate the federal government's.
Logically, state constitutions are prior in the sense that there is no more
reason for a state court to reach a federal constitutional issue when the
case can be decided by application of the state constitution than there is
for any court to reach any constitutional issue when the case can be de-
cided on statutory or other nonconstitutional grounds.36
While I recognized the logic of Linde's position, I was less than en-
thusiastic about accepting its implications. This was so, I like to think,
not so much because of the novelty of the theory as that it seemed a bit
artificial, and redundant as well. After all, in areas like freedom of
speech, equal protection, and due process, the United States Supreme
Court seemed to be doing a pretty good job; and in any event it had been
doing the job for some decades, while state constitutional jurisprudence
in the human rights arena was virtually nonexistent. To suggest that
state courts should suddenly begin to give flesh to state constitutional
skeletons in the face of such weighty pronouncements from on high
seemed like academic chutzpah, and in any event of little significance.
The significance, of course, became apparent as the Burger and
Rehnquist Courts began to retreat from some of the Warren Court's in-
terpretations of the federal Bill of Rights. This retreat made it more at-
tractive to explore the possibility, which had always existed, that people
35. See, eg., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (applying sixth amendment right to
counsel to state criminal prosecutions); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (applying
first amendment guaranty of free speech to the states).
36. Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States' Bills of Rights, 9 U. BALT. L. REv.
379, 380-84 (1980).
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might have rights under the constitutions of their respective states which
they did not have under the federal Constitution.37 In California, the
implications were made explicit in a constitutional amendment, adopted
by voter initiative in 1974, providing: "Rights guaranteed by this Consti-
tution are not dependent on those guaranteed by the United States
Constitution.
'38
These developments accelerated acceptance of state constitutions as
independent sources of civil rights and liberties. Concomitantly, how-
ever, they also laid proponents of state constitutional jurisprudence open
to the charge of using state constitutional theory in a result-oriented fash-
ion to bypass the United States Supreme Court. And in that atmosphere,
the logical and historical arguments for the independence of state consti-
tutions tended to get lost.
In my case, at any rate, it was not until I became a judge, and began
to look at the state constitution in the light of its history and in the con-
text of cases which I was called upon to decide, that I became fully per-
suaded of the Linde view. The reports of the California Convention of
184939 are themselves adequate to convince any skeptic that the framers
intended the California Declaration of Rights to stand as an independent
document. Moreover, the records of the subsequent convention, in 1879,
are replete with discussions which evidence an intent to establish rights
which arguably exceeded the scope of federal protection.' I decided that
I simply could not be faithful to the oath I took upon becoming a judge,
without giving full and independent consideration to the constitution of
California. I became a convert.
It is not that I am proud of my tardy conversion, nor do I imagine
that my personal intellectual development is of any great interest in itself,
particularly as I am no longer on the bench. My reason for describing my
experience is that I suspect that I am not alone, and that the legal com-
munity is in fact full of people- lawyers, judges, and legal scholars-
whose acceptance of the independence of state constitutional protection
for individual rights is less than full.
It is true that state constitutional theory has made great strides. The
United States Supreme Court has squarely confronted and accepted the
proposition that a state may grant its citizens rights greater than those
37. For an excellent treatment of this subject,- see Brennan, State Constitutions and the
Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARv. L. REv. 489, 495-502 (1977).
38. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 24 (adopted Nov. 5, 1974).
39. See supra note 14.
40. Mitchell v. Superior Court, 43 Cal. 3d 107, 119 n.11, 729 P.2d 212, 219 n.11, 232 Cal.
Rptr. 900, 907 n.11 (1987).
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they have under the federal Constitution.4' State court decisions resting
upon independent state grounds have proliferated in recent years,42 and
with them law review articles and symposia43 discussing and analyzing
the development. The better lawyers have learned to make state consti-
tutional arguments, the Association of State Attorney Generals has es-
tablished an office for the exchange of information on the subject" and-
the mark of true acceptance-there is at least one law school casebook in
the offing.45
Still, acceptance is slow. Few law schools attempt to teach their
students about state constitutional developments in any substantial way.
Most lawyers, confronted with a constitutional issue, do not think about
their state constitution unless it comes to their attention through re-
search or court direction. And courts themselves are not always consis-
tent in dealing with the question of priority-a fact which tends to
undermine legitimacy in the eyes of the legal community.46
Sometimes, a state court in declaring a governmental act unconstitu-
tional will refer only to the federal Constitution, without mentioning the
state constitution at all. This is understandable, even if analytically im-
pure, when unconstitutionality under federal decisions seems quite clear.
But it entails substantial risk. If, as has been known to occur, the United
States Supreme Court grants certiorari, reverses, and throws the case
back into the state court's lap, the state court is confronted with a situa-
tion which, at best requires duplication of effort, and at worst-if the
state court reaffirms its original ruling on the basis of the state constitu-
tion-is hardly conducive to confidence in the judicial branch.47
State courts have also been known to mention both constitutions
and to waffle as to which one is the basis for decision.48 While such
41. Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980) (affirming the authority
of states, in the exercise of police power or sovereign right, to adopt in their own constitutions
individual liberties more expansive than those conferred by the federal Constitution).
42. See generally, Developments in the Law-The Interpretation of State Constitutional
Rights, 95 HARv. L. REv. 1324, 1367-1493 (1982) (discussing state court interpretations of
state constitutions.).
43. See, eg., Brennan, supra note 37; Symposium, The Emergence of State Constitutional
Law, 63 TEx. L. REv. 959-1375 (1985).
44. National Association of State Attorney Generals has established a clearing house pro-
ject on state constitutional law.
45. R. WILLIAMS, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND COM-
MENTARIES (1988).
46. See, eg., Deukmejian & Thompson, All Sail and No Anchor--Judicial Review Under
the California Constitution, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 975, 987-91 (1979).
47. See, eg., People v. Ramos, 37 Cal. 3d 136, 689 P.2d 430, 207 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1984).
48. See. e.g., Allen v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. 3d 520, 557 P.2d 65, 134 Cal. Rptr. 774
(1976). For a criticism of Allen see Deukmejian & Thompson, supra note 46, at 1008-09.
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ambiguity may be the product of imprecise opinion writing, one suspects
that another factor may sometimes be an unwillingness on the part of the
state tribunal to accept full responsibility for what may be an unpopular
decision. The United States Supreme Court's declaration in Michigan v.
Long,4 9 that it will consider a state court's constitutional decision to be
based on federal grounds unless it clearly appears that the opinion is
based on independent state grounds, was aimed at forcing state courts to
avoid such ambiguity."0 And so far as I am aware it has had that effect.
I am quite sympathetic to the plight of state court judges faced with the
necessity of unpopular decisions. I share the concern Justice Stevens
voiced in his dissent about the priorities of the United States Supreme
Court when it reviews state court decisions granting citizens more rights
than the high court thinks they have."1 However, I do not view the Long
holding as hostile to the system of constitutional federalism. Rather, I
agree with Justice O'Connor that it is better for the integrity of that sys-
tem that state courts, in finding governmental acts unconstitutional, be
precise and candid about the basis for their decisions. 2
Then there are the state courts which indulge in a double play, hold-
ing that a governmental act violates both the federal and state constitu-
tions.53 Critics have maintained that this double play is foul because it
inappropriately insulates the decision both from United States Supreme
Court review and from change through amendment of the state constitu-
tion.5 Technically, the critics are wrong about the latter. Opponents of
the decision can still seek state constitutional amendment through the
voter initiative process or other prescribed procedures, and thereafter,
assuming they succeed, seek federal review of the state court's ultimate
determination of federal law. Practically, however, a state court's pro-
nouncement on unconstitutionality under the federal Constitution is
likely to make such a course of action politically more difficult, and in
any event such a pronouncement violates the customary practice of
49. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
50. Id. at 1040-42.
51. Id. at 1065-72 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (pointing out that the Court's shift in priorities
has created a misallocation of the Court's resources, resulting in "a docket swollen with re-
quests by states to reverse judgements that their courts have rendered in favor of their
citizens.").
52. If a state court chooses merely to rely on federal precedents as it would on the
precedents of all other jurisdictions, then it need only make clear by a plain statement
in its judgment or opinion that the federal cases are being used only for the purpose
of guidance, and do not themselves compel the result that the court has reached. In
this way, both justice and judicial administration will be greatly improved.
Id. at 1041.
53. See, eg., Michigan v. Long, 413 Mich. 461, 320 N.W.2d 866 (1982).
54. See, eg., Deukmejian & Thompson, supra note 46, at 996-99.
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courts to avoid deciding more than they are called upon to decide. This
judicial preference for dispensing claims by means of statutory interpre-
tation rather than reaching serious constitutional questions5 5 seems more
appropriate here, and to that extent I agree with the critics.
There is another criticism with which I do not agree. It concerns
the situation arising when a state constitutional provision is identical in
language to its federal analogue, and there is no constitutional history to
distinguish its meaning. It is all very well for a state court to rely upon
its state constitution to provide a higher level of protection for individual
rights than the federal Constitution, say some critics, but there must be
some basis for doing so either in the distinctive language of the state
constitution or its legislative history. 6 If the language is the same, and
there is nothing peculiar to the state provision that the court can point to
in support of a different meaning, then, say these critics, for a state court
simply to disagree with the United States Supreme Court on the meaning
of identical language constitutes unjustified judicial activism and demon-
strates a lack of proper hierarchical deference.
I do not find this criticism persuasive. The presence of distinctive
language or history obviously presents the most comfortable context for
relying upon independent state grounds. In the absence of such factors,
however, state courts are still obliged to find meaning in the provisions of
the state constitution. And however they interpret their constitutions-
whether on the basis of text, intent, or a more broad criterion for consti-
tutional adjudication 57-neither logic nor history requires that they ac-
cord state constitutional language the same meaning as the United States
Supreme Court has accorded a comparable provision of the federal
Constitution.
Certainly, a state court should consider and give deliberative weight
to such a decision by the High Court. And arguably a state court should
accord greater deference to the decision of another court-state or fed-
eral-in the arena of basic human rights, in the interest of maintaining
whatever consensus may exist on the meaning of such core constitutional
concepts as due process, freedom of speech, or self-incrimination. But
consensus is not the only relevant value, and when there is already disa-
greement within the United States Supreme Court and among state
courts, consensus is likely to be elusive.
55. See, e.g., United States v. Clark, 445 U.S. 23, 27 (1980); San Francisco Unified School
Dist. v. Johnson, 3 Cal. 3d 937, 942, 479 P.2d 669, 670, 92 Cal. Rptr. 309, 310 (1971).
56. See, e.g., Deukmejian & Thompson, supra note 46, at 987-96.
57. See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980); Brest, The Misconceived Quest for
the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REV. 204 (1980); Address by Judge Robert Bork, San
Diego Law School (Nov. 18, 1985).
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While I was on the California Supreme Court, the case of People v.
Houston 5 8 came before us. Houston illustrated this problem in a dra-
matic way. In Houston, police had obtained the defendant's confession
after he was given his Miranda warnings but while an attorney who had
been retained by the defendant's friends and family was waiting at the
police station to talk to him. The question presented was whether the
police had an obligation to advise the defendant of the attorney's pres-
ence, and whether their failure to do so rendered the confession inadmis-
sible. Numerous state courts had confronted this question, and their
virtually unanimous response was that the confession should not be ad-
mitted.5 9 But, while Houston was pending, an almost identical case, Mo-
ran v. Burbine,6 ° was on the United States Supreme Court docket. The
Court managed to render an opinion first, holding six to three that the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the federal Constitution did not bar ad-
mission of the confession.61
There were no relevant textual differences between the California
and federal Constitutions, 62 nor could we point to any distinctive history
in support of a different interpretation. But then the United States
Supreme Court did not rely upon history in its decision either; it was a
matter, rather, of applying existing principles in the light of fairness and
practicality.63 A decision of the United States Supreme Court in such a
case was entitled, we said, to "respectful consideration."'  But our ma-
jority agreed with the three dissenters in Burbine,6 and thus applied the
California Constitution as they would have applied the federal
58. 42 Cal. 3d 595, 724 P.2d 1166, 230 Cal. Rptr. 141 (1986).
59. See, e.g., State v. Matthews, 408 So. 2d 1274 (La. 1982) (attorney's request to speak
with defendant was refused and his subsequent instruction to cease interrogation was ignored);
State v. Jones, 19 Wash. App. 850, 578 P.2d 71 (1978) (police failed to inform defendant that
counsel had been retained for him or that counsel had instructed him not to speak); Common-
wealth v. Sherman, 389 Mass. 287, 450 N.E.2d 566 (1983) (police denied lawyer's request to be
present during interrogation and failed to inform defendant that the request had been made).
60. 475 U.S. 412 (1986).
61. Id. at 434.
62. "No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against him-
self... ." U. S. CONST. amend. V. "Persons may not ... be compelled in a criminal cause to be
a witness against themselves .... CAL. CONST. art. I, § 15. "In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence . U. " S.
CONST. amend. VI. "The defendant in a criminal cause has the right ... to have the assistance
of counsel for the defendant's defense .. " CAL. CONST., art. I, § 15.
63. 475 U.S. at 421-23 (police followed Miranda procedures in obtaining defendant's writ-
ten waiver prior to eliciting his confession; his waiver was held valid as a matter of law because
defendant was not coerced and knew he could remain silent and request a lawyer).
64. 42 Cal. 3d at 610-11, 724 P.2d at 1174, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 149.
65. 475 U.S. at 434-68 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (joined by Brennan, J. and Marshall, J.).
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Constitution. 66
The merits of the underlying issue in Houston are irrelevant to my
point.6 7 My point is that there does not seem to be any stronger reason
for our court to have deferred to the six-to-three decision of the United
States Supreme Court on the meaning of the federal Constitution than
there would have been for that Court to defer to a narrowly divided deci-
sion of our court on the meaning of the California Constitution had we
managed to file our opinion first.
Indeed, a somewhat stronger argument can be made that state
courts should defer to the decisions of sister state courts on the meaning
and application of cognate state constitutional provisions. Historically,
such provisions are more likely to share a common ancestry. 68 More-
over, as other commentators have observed, the United States Supreme
Court operates within a system that imposes constraints that are either
not present or not present to the same degree in state systems. 69 In de-
claring the content of the federal Bill of Rights, the United States
Supreme Court must take into account that it is setting the constitutional
floor for fifty states, and principles of federalism-not present in the state
systems-caution special restraint in that process. It must also take into
account the fact that, for all practical purposes, its constitutional word
will be final, whereas state constitutions are much more readily subject to
amendment. In all these respects, sister state courts are operating within
a similar political environment that is independent of the federal system.
I have one final observation. If state constitutions are to be ac-
corded the respect they deserve by the legal community, ultimately there
must be some understanding and acceptance of that process by the gen-
eral community. Yet I doubt that many nonlawyers are even aware of
the existence of state bills of rights, much less their contents or their
independent significance. Moreover, I strongly suspect that not much is
being done to remedy this situation, either in the schools or in the various
fora of public education. I suggest that we lawyers, individually and
through our bar associations, have a responsibility in this regard as well.
66. 42 Cal. 3d at 614, 724 P.2d at 1177, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 152.
67. Justice Lucas wrote a fine dissent on the merits, without emphasizing the points dis-
cussed here. 42 Cal. 3d at 617-26, 724 P.2d at 1180-86, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 155-61.
68. See Galie, The Other Supreme Courts: Judicial Activism Among State Supreme Courts,
33 SYRACUSE L. REV. 731, 734-53 (1982).
69. Id. at 787-92.
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